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RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATra POWER To REALIGN POLIT-
ICAL SUBDIVISIONs HELD LIMITED BY FIFTEENTH A MENDMENT
Petitioners, Negroes and former residents of the city of Tuskegee,
Alabama, sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief in federal
district court, claiming that an Alabama statute 1 redefining the boundaries
of the city of Tuskegee violated the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments of
the Constitution. The complaint alleged that the statute changed the
shape of the city from a square into an irregular twenty-eight-sided figure,2
and that the effect of this transformation was to remove from the city all
but four or five of its 400 Negro voters while not removing a single white
elector.3 The district court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction and
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.4 The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. 5 The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the power of the state to alter or destroy its political
subdivisions is limited by the fifteenth amendment 6 and that the authority
of the federal courts to consider the question of infringement of petitioners'
right to vote was not foreclosed by the "political question" doctrine of
Colegrove v. Green.7 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
A state's power to alter or destroy its political subdivisions has here-
tofore been commonly thought to be unrestricted by the Constitution.8
The cornerstone of this dogma was laid by the Supreme Court in Hunter
v. City of Pittsburgh, which involved a claim by the residents of Allegheny,
Pennsylvania, that the state legislature's proposed consolidation of the cities
of Allegheny and Pittsburgh impaired an implied contract between the city
1 Ala. Acts 1957, No. 140.
2 The old and new boundaries are mapped in an Appendix to the Opinion of the
Court, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 348 (1960).
3 Before the alteration of the boundaries Tuskegee contained approximately 5,397
Negroes and 1,310 white persons. Of its qualified voters about 400 were Negro and
600, white. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, p. 2, Gomillion v. Light-
foot, stipra note 2.
4 Gomillion v. Lightfoot 167 F. Supp. 405 (M.D. Ala. 1958). The court did
not distinguish betveen these two grounds. Compare Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678
(1946).
5 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 270 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1959) (2-to-1 decision).
6 Petitioners also claimed relief under the fourteenth amendment. See Gomillion
v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340 (1960). The majority of the Court, per Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, pointedly omitted to consider that claim. But Mr. Justice Whittaker,
concurring, thought the decision could only rest on the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 364 U.S. at 349 (concurring opinion).
7 328 U.S. 549 (1946). See notes 13-16 infra and accompanying text.
8 See COOLEY, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 22, at 70, 31-34 (1914); R HYNE,
MuNICIpAL LAW § 2-26, at 27 (1957); 1 YOKLEY, MUNIcIPAL CORPORAIONS §§ 6,
11, 16, 22 (1956).
9 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
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and its citizens that municipal taxes would be spent for the benefit of
Allegheny alone. It was also contended that to subject Allegheny residents
to the increased tax burdens likely to result from the consolidation would
deprive them of their property without due process of law. The Court
rejected both contentions and declared, by way of dictum, that as between
a state and its municipal corporations "the State is supreme, and its legis-
lative body, conforming its action to the state constitution, may do as it
will, unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution of the United
States." 10 The effect of this sweeping statement is fortified by a series
of cases holding that the relationship between a state and its governmental
subdivisions does not constitute a contractual obligation protected by the
Constitution."L Thus, while it has required that when states realign their
subdivisions they preserve to the creditors of units thereby destroyed some
means for collecting the debts owed them,'2 the Court has never enjoined
a realignment on the ground that it violated the constitutional rights of any
or all of the residents of the affected subdivisions.
This practice is complemented, where the subdivision also represents
a voting unit, by the "political question" doctrine enunciated in Colegrove
v. Green.'8  Under this doctrine the Court has refused to consider suits
seeking to upset the boundaries of malapportioned voting districts' 4
on the ground that such suits involve questions "peculiarly political [in]
nature and therefore not meet for judicial determination." 15 The exercise
of this self-restraint has permitted state legislatures to retain political sub-
divisions whose residents have had their voting strength diluted by popula-
tion shifts or to achieve, by means of affirmative action, malapportionment
of voting districts in order to weaken the political influence of particular
segments of the population.' 6  Thus a state's action concerning its voting
subdivisions, lying as it does at the confluence of these two doctrines, has
'l Id. at 179.
". See City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923) ; City of Pawhuska
v. Pawbuska Oil & Gas Co., 250 U.S. 394 (1919). Cf. Comm'rs of Laramie County v.
Conm'rs of Albany County, 92 U.S. 307 (1875).
12 See Shapleigh v. San Angelo, 167 U.S. 646 (1897) ; Mobile v. United States
ex rel. Watson, 116 U.S. 289 (1886); Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U.S. 514
(1879) ; Broughton v. Pensacola, 93 U.S. 266 (1876).
13 328 U.S. 549 (1946). While Hunter involved a municipal corporation and
Colegrove congressional districts, the opinion in the instant case does not imply that
the identity of the subdivision involved is crucial; the Court discusses a state's power
over its political subdivisions--"to wit, cities, counties, and other local units"-gen-
erally. Instant case at 342. While Colegrove has apparently never been applied to
municipalities, it has been applied to counties used as voting units. See South v.
Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950).
14 The Court has followed an uneven pattern in disposing of these appeals. See,
e.g., Radford v. Gary, 352 U.S. 991 (1957), affirming per curiam 154 F. Supp. 541
(W.D. Okla. 1956), citing Kidd v. McCanless, 352 U.S. 920 (1956), dismissing
appeal from 200 Tenn. 273, 292 S.W.2d 40 (1956); Colegrove v. Barrett, 330 U.S.
804 (1947), dismissing for want of substantial federal question, appeal from judgment
of March 10, 1947 of the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (un-
reported).
15 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. at 552.
16 See Lewis, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Courts, 71 HARv. L.
REv. 1057, 1059-66 (1958).
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been thought to be insulated from judicial application of the restraints of the
fourteenth and fifteenth amendments.
In reaching its decision in the instant case, the Court virtually obli-
terated the Hunter dogma by limiting that case to its facts, labeling the
sweeping language of the opinion "dictum," and expressly repudiating
broad interpretations based on that language.17 In the Court's view,
Hunter and kindred cases 18 only held that "the State's authority is un-
restrained by the particular prohibitions of the Constitution considered in
those cases": the contract clause and the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.' 9 In addition, the Court rejected defendant's contention that
relief was, in any event, barred by the Colegrove case. The Court spe-
cifically distinguished Colegrove on the ground that that case involved
dilution of the strength of votes as "a result of legislative inaction over a
course of many years," whereas the instant case brought into question
"affirmative legislative action" which deprived petitioners of their votes.20
But in devoting its attention almost exclusively to a demonstration of the in-
applicability of Hunter and Colegrove, the Court left its conclusion that
under the facts alleged the challenged statute "denied or abridged" the
petitioners' right to vote, as guaranteed by the fifteenth amendment, with
little analysis or discussion.21 A closer examination of this issue, particu-
larly with reference to prior decisions of the Supreme Court, suggests that
the decision in the instant case has subtly added a new dimension to the
meaning of the right to vote. The effect of previous cases under the fifteenth
amendment has been to strike down state action which prevented Negroes
from voting either in any election for any officials at any level of govern-
ment,2 2 in the primary of the party of their choice,23 or in the only election
in which they could effectively express a preference.24  The instant case
37 See instant case at 342-44.
Is See cases cited note 11 supra.
19 Instant case at 344.
20 Instant case at 346.
21 Before launching its discussion of Hunter and Colegrove, the Court made the
following statement:
If these allegations upon a trial remained uncontradicted or unqualified, the
conclusion would be irresistible, tantamount for all practical purposes to a
mathematical demonstration, that the legislation is solely concerned with segre-
gating white and colored voters by fencing Negro citizens out of town so as to
deprive them of their pre-existing municipal vote.
It is difficult to appreciate what stands in the way of adjudging a statute
having this inevitable effect invalid in light of the principles by which this Court
must judge, and uniformly has judged, statutes, that howsoever speciously defined,
obviously discriminate against colored citizens.
Instant case at 341-42. This passage constituted the Court's discussion of the effect
of the statute.
22 See Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939) ; Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S.
347 (1915); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915) (dictum).
23See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). Cf. United States v. Classic,
313 U.S. 299 (1941). Earlier cases involving discrimination against Negroes in
primaries were decided under the equal protection clause. See Nixon v. Condon,
286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
24 See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
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apparently involved no such sweeping exclusion of Negroes from the polls,
but merely a denial of the right to vote in a particular political subdivision.
While the Court may have considered sub silentio petitioners' claim that
registration to vote in their new place of residence would be extremely
difficult,2 5 the opinion itself ignored this issue and thus seems to have ex-
panded the fifteenth amendment's protection to include the right to vote in
a particular political unit without abridgement 26 by unreasonable and
arbitrary manipulation of boundaries 2 7 for the purpose of disenfranchising,
at least in that unit, members of a particular racial group.
Although the Court did not consider petitioners' claim that the re-
alignment violated the equal protection clause, 2s it would appear that the
instant case might nevertheless have an impact on the judicial application
of that provision. Here, however, conflict with Colegrove v. Green is even
more immediate, since it is in cases arising under this clause that the
doctrine of that case has had its greatest application and importance.20
But if the right to vote, whether protected by the specific terms of the
fifteenth amendment or the broader wording of the equal protection clause,
means what the present case appears to say it does-that is, the right to
vote in a particular subdivision unless the legislature, in adjusting its
boundaries, can show some legitimate purpose for the realignment 30 -
then the Court would appear to have taken a major step toward permitting
judicial review of realignment schemes 3 1 which are aimed at discriminating
25 See Brief for Petitioners, p. 5. Perhaps another unarticulated consideration
was the effect of the gerrymandering on the school segregation problem.
26 For a discussion of what the drafters of the fifteenth amendment probably
intended by the word "abridged," see Mathews, Legislative and Judicial History of
the Fifteenth Amendment 38-39, in 27 JoiiNs HOPKINS UNIV. STUDIEs IN HISTORICAL
AND POLITICAL SCIENCE (1909).
27 Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the Court seems to allow that if the state
could show some legitimate purpose for its action, the legislation would be valid:
"Against this claim the respondents have never suggested, either in their brief or in
oral argument, any countervailing municipal function which Act 140 is designed to
serve." Instant case at 342. This tolerance would accord with the test of reason-
ableness usually applied under the equal protection clause. See, e.g., Morey v. Doud,
354 U.S. 457 (1957) ; Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 301
U.S. 459 (1937); Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32 (1928). Com-
pare Professor Freund's contention that the Supreme Court should apply a test
analogous to that applied in commerce clause cases, see, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City
of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951), to civil rights cases, asking whether the
government could reach its objective by other, less damaging means. Freund, Com-
inent, in GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW 357-58 (Sutherland ed. 1956).
28 Compare instant case at 349 (concurring opinion of Whittaker, J.); note 6
supra.2 9 Although the Court has never applied the doctrine in a fifteenth amendment
case, the Court's discussion of Colegrove in the instant case would seem to raise the
inference that its application in such cases is not without the realm of possibility.
Instant case at 346-47. But see Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function,
in GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW 19 (Sutherland ed. 1956), where Justice Frankfurter
does not mention the fifteenth amendment as one under which the courts must decide
whether to abstain from adjudication because of the "political" nature of the question
involved.
30 See note 27 mspra.
31 Although the Court's opinion in Colegrove emphasized Congress' responsibility
for securing fair representation, see 328 U.S. at 554-56, the subsequent application
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against particular ethnic, political, religious, or geographical sectors of the
electorate.
32
Even if the present case has these broader ramifications which its
narrow ground-violation of the fifteenth amendment-would not imme-
diately suggest, the Court was not necessarily mistaken in distinguishing
Colegrove v. Green. The criterion on which the Court relies-the presence
of "affirmative legislative action" in the instant case 33 -while not com-
pletely satisfactory,34 nevertheless serves to distinguish this case from most
of those in which Colegrove has been applied, cases where the complaints
were directed against persistent legislative inaction which, together with
large population shifts, had served to dilute the electoral strength of certain
segments of the population.35 However, the use of judicial power in the
instant case to strike down a redistricting statute suggests the feasibility, at
least from the point of view of judicial administration, of invoking that
power in cases in which state legislatures, by affirmative action, have
effected redistricting schemes which result in discernible patterns of dis-
crimination based solely on grounds of political affiliation, for example, and
which seemingly have no other rational purpose or motive.
The obstacle to reaching any firm assessment of the impact of the
instant case, however, is the uncertainty veiling the present relationship
between rights protected by the fifteenth amendment and those guar-
anteed by the equal protection clause. Some recent decisions involving
Negroes' rights have led one critic to accuse the Court of abandoning con-
stitutional principle in order to strike down all invidious schemes for
of the doctrine in South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950), where an injunction against
the use of Georgia's county unit system in both federal and state elections was sought,
would appear to indicate some broader reason for the doctrine than mere separation
of powers within the federal government. See note 13 supra. Likewise, the Court
in the instant case, while pointing out the fact that Colegrove involved congressional
elections, did not attempt to distinguish the case on that ground. See discussion of
Colegrove, instant case at 346-47.
32 Undoubtedly the most prevalent discrimination today is that worked against
urban voters by rural-dominated legislatures. See Lewis, =pra note 16, at 1059-66.
This was the basis of the complaint in both the Colegrove and South cases. However,
since this discrimination usually grows out of legislative inaction and major population
shifts, and generally concerns state and federal rather than local elections, the prob-
lems presented differ from those involved in the instant case. See note 34 infra.
33 Instant case at 346.
34 Probably a more realistic distinction is the ready availability of an effective
remedy in the instant case. Whereas the Court in Colgrove, had it taken jurisdiction
and decided for the plaintiffs, would have been obliged either to devise a direct order
requiring legislative reapportionment, to enjoin the application of the existing appor-
tionment scheme, thereby indirectly forcing reapportionment or an election-at-large,
or to apportion the congressional districts itself---each of which presents its own
peculiar difficulties-the Court here, by invalidating the allegedly discriminatory statute,
presumably achieved a reversion of the boundaries to their former position. Compare
South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 280 (1950) (dissenting opinion of Douglas, J.). For
a discussion of the Court's reluctance to work in this area and the problems of formu-
lating effective remedies, see Lewis, supra note 16, at 1066-70, 1087-90; Note, 15
RuTGRas L. REv. 82 (1960) ; Note, 62 HARv. L. REv. 659, 665-69 (1949).
35 Colegrove itself involved Illinois congressional districts which were drawn in
1901. 328 U.S. at 550. See also Shiver v. Gray, 276 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1960)
(15-year lapse since last redistricting); Baker v. Carr, 179 F. Supp. 824 (M.D.
Tenn. 1959), prob. juris. noted, 364 U.S. 898 (1960), rearguinent scheduled, 366 U.S.
907 (1961) (last redistricting in 1901).
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discriminating against the colored race.8 6 In rebuttal, another commentator
has argued that the fifteenth amendment demands of the states "a heavier
affirmative duty to assure an equal franchise than does the fourteenth," 3 7
and therefore the principles by which these cases are judged are necessarily
different and more stringent. Only future litigation will tell whether the
emphasis which the Court placed upon the racial aspect of the instant
case 85 implies that state power to realign political subdivisions is virtually
unlimited so long as any discrimination which results runs along other than
racial lines. In any event, the instant case shows that federal courts can
and will invoke their equity powers in some cases involving legislative re-
alignment of political subdivisions. The case makes it more imperative
than ever that the Court-at least in those cases involving rights appar-
ently identical with those recognized here 39-abandon the perfunctory
format of the per curiam opinions which have marked the application of the
Colegrove doctrine.
40
36 Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REV.
1, 28-29 (1959). Professor Wechsler argues that the prohibitions of the fifteenth
amendment and of the equal protection clause are, or at least should be, identical,
and that Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), and Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461
(1953), do not pass muster by this standard. He ponders whether the Court would
have reached the same decisions in these cases had they involved a religious party
which excluded members of other faiths from its primary elections. Id. at 29.
37 See Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: a Reply to Pro-
fessor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. Rtv. 1, 23 (1959). Professor Pollak bases his argu-
ment on the premise that unless the fifteenth amendment does so, it "would be a
redundancy, having no scope for separate and effective application." Ibid. This
view, however, seems to slight the historical background of the suffrage amendment.
It must be remembered that at the time of its adoption, the right to vote was not
thought of as one of the privileges and immunities of national citizenship, which
were what the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment was
intended to safeguard. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874)
(denial of women's suffrage does not violate the fourteenth amendment). And even
recognition of this right as a concomitant of national citizenship would not have
achieved the purpose of those who drafted the fifteenth amendment, for they, as
Professor Pollak points out, sought to protect the right to vote against abridgement
in any election-federal, state, or local-on account of race, color, or previous con-
dition of servitude. Pollak, supra at 23. See generally Mathews, supra note 26, at
37-38. And if the privileges and immunities which accrued from national citizenship
did not include the right to vote in federal elections, clearly they did not include the
right to vote in state and local elections, inasmuch as the first sentence of that amend-
ment expressly recognizes the distinction between national and state citizenship. That
this desire to remedy what was then deemed to be a deficiency in the existing consti-
tutional guarantees represents the origins of the fiftenth amendment was suggested
by the Supreme Court in Minor v. Happersett, supra at 175 (dictum). And as
for the equal protection clause, it is perhaps sufficient to note that the Minor case
did not even consider this clause as a possible guarantor of women's suffrage and
that the history of the amendment which Professor Mathews details makes no mention
that the problem of redundancy was raised. If these factors sufficiently explain the
historical raison d'etre of the amendment-toward which the claim of redundancy
would appear inevitably directed-subsequent interpretations of the equal protection
clause which have now rendered the fifteenth amendment perhaps largely unnecessary
would not demand a searching, as Professor Pollak seems to indicate, for some dis-
tinction in the principles applied to the two amendments. If there is no such need,
Professor Pollak might well accept the relevance of the instant case to the equal
protection clause, inasmuch as he also recognizes the function of that clause as a
guarantor of the franchise. Pollak, mupra at 23.
38 See note 21 supra.
89 See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
40 See note 14 sutra.
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CORPORATIONS-STOCKHOLDERS' REFUSAL To SUE Is No BAR
TO DERVATIVE SUIT FOR CONTINUING VIOLATION OF FEDERAL ANTTI-
TRUST LAws
Plaintiff submitted a resolution to a shareholders' meeting' of Metal
& Thermit Corporation (M & T) calling upon the directors to sue
American Can Company (Canco), a major shareholder in M & T 2 and
its principal supplier of raw materials, for violations of the antitrust laws.
3
An independent majority of the shareholders defeated the resolution.
4
Plaintiff then instituted a derivative suit in a federal district court against
Canco and the directors of M & T, praying for treble damages for past
violations of the antitrust laws and an injunction against future violations.5
Defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that the prior shareholders'
vote was a binding exercise of the corporation's business judgment not to
sue. But the court held that in view of plaintiff's allegation of a continuing
antitrust violation, the shareholders' vote must be taken as an invalid
attempt to ratify the directors' illegal actions and hence as no bar to plain-
tiff's derivative suit. The motion to dismiss was overruled. Rogers v.
American Can Co., 187 F. Supp. 532 (D.N.J. 1960), appeal docketed, No.
13493, 3d Cir., Jan. 12, 1961.
A derivative suit is brought by a shareholder on behalf of his corpora-
tion to enforce a cause of action which the management refuses to pursue.6
The dangers inherent in permitting shareholders to bring corporate suits
without the knowledge or against the will of the management or majority
shareholders 7 have caused the courts to impose certain prerequisites upon
would-be plaintiffs in such actions. For example, the plaintiff must allege
his own status as a shareholder when the cause of action arose," refusal by
the directors to act after proper demand,9 and, in most cases, failure of the
shareholders to respond to a similar demand.' 0 The courts, however, have
1 Exhaustion of intracorporate remedies is a prerequisite to bringing a derivative
suit in a federal district court. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (b).
2 Canco owned about 23% of the voting shares of M & T and was able to elect
eight of the twelve directors.
3The gravamen of plaintiff's complaint was that Canco had fixed its prices to
M & T arbitrarily and, by its illegal control over M & T, had disabled M & T from
purchasing raw materials in the competitive market.
4 Without the votes of Canco's shares, the resolution was defeated by more than
two to one.
5 Plaintiff charged violations of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209
(1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1958), and §§ 7 and 8 of the Clayton Act, 38
Stat. 731, 732 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 19 (1958). See note 3 mupra.
6 Booth v. Robinson, 55 Md. 419, 438-39 (1881) ; Bartlett v. New York, N.H. &
H.R.R., 221 Mass. 530, 109 N.E. 452 (1915); 13 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
§ 5945 (rev. vol. 1961) ; STEVENS, CORPORATIONS § 168 (2d ed. 1949).
7 See STEVENS, op. cit. supra note 6, §§ 171-73, discussing in part the problem of
the "strike suit."
SId. § 171.
9 Akin v. Mackie, 203 Tenn. 113, 310 S.W.2d 164 (1958) (stating the general
rule) ; 13 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 6, § 5963.
10 American Life Ins. Co. v. Powell, 262 Ala. 560, 80 So. 2d 487 (1955) ; Loxair
Corp. v. Biscoe, 192 Ga. 357, 15 S.E.2d 438 (1941) ; STEVENS, op. cit. supra note 6,
19611
1180 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.109
differed as to the effect of an adverse stockholders' vote. One generally
accepted maxim is that shareholders may not ratify illegal actions by the
directors." However, in recent years 12 a new principle has been developed
that stockholders may make an independent and reasonable judgment that
it would not be in the best interest of their corporation to pursue a given
cause of action.13 The leading case espousing that view is S. Solomont &
Sons Trust, Inc. v. New England Theatres Operating Corp.,'4 in which
the Massachusetts court approved the procedure of the trial court, which
had taken evidence as to the considerations that motivated the stock-
holders when they voted not to sue, and had determined on the basis of that
evidence that the vote was reasonable. While the Solomont approach
prevents an unwilling majority from being forced to assert claims which
may be worthless or harmful in the long run to the corporation,' 5 it may
also tend to weaken the derivative suit as an institution for protecting
minority shareholders' rights because shareholders in large corporations
must undertake expensive proxy battles to make most certain the chances
of bringing the suit.' 6 Furthermore, if the approach is to be justified, the
rather dubious proposition that shareholders always have adequate informa-
tion and experience to judge whether or not a cause of action should be
pressed must be assumed.'
7
While indicating disapproval of the Solomont holding, the court in the
instant case distinguished that case on the fact that the Massachusetts court
decided no more than the effect of a stockholders' vote upon a suit to redress
injuries inflicted in the past.' The instant case involved allegations of a
course of conduct continuing into the future, from which, together with the
§ 169. This requirement has been relaxed where demand would be futile either
because management would control the shareholder vote, Gottesman v. General Motors
Corp., 171 F. Supp. 661 (S.D.N.Y.), petition for interlocutory appeal denied, 268
F.2d 194 (2nd Cir. 1959); Von Arnim v. American Tube Works, 188 Mass. 515,
74 N.E. 680 (1905); Akin v. Mackie, supra note 9, or because the stockholders do
not have the legal power to prevent suit, Continental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y.
7, 99 N.E. 138 (1912).
11 See, e.g., Mayer v. Adams, 141 A.2d 458 (Del. 1958) ; Continental Sec. Co. v.
Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138 (1912).
12 This is not to say that Continental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, mipra note 11, was the
only law before 1950. Kessler & Co. v. Ensley Co., 129 Fed. 397 (C.C.N.D. Ala.
1904), cert. denied, 205 U.S. 541 (1907), decided that a stockholders' vote not to sue
barred suit, and Siegman v. Electric Vehicle Co., 72 N.J. Eq. 403, 65 Ati. 910 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1906) decided the opposite. Cf. Groel v. United Electric Co., 70 N.J. Eq.
616, 61 At. 1061 (Ch. 1905).
'3 See Pomerantz v. Clark, 101 F. Supp. 341 (D. Mass. 1951) ; S. Solomont &
Sons Trust, Inc. v. New England Theatres Operating Corp., 326 Mass. 99, 93 N.E.2d
241 (1950) ; Claman v. Robertson, 154 Ohio St. 61, 128 N.E.2d 429 (1955).
'4 326 Mass. 99, 93 N.E.2d 241 (1950).
15 See Kessler & Co. v. Ensley Co., 129 Fed. 397 (C.C.N.D. Ala. 1904), cert.
denied, 205 U.S. 541 (1907). See also Note, 73 HARv. L. Rsv. 746, 749-52, 760-61
(1960).
16 See Pomerantz v. Clark, 101 F. Supp. 341, 344-46 (D. Mass. 1951).
17 See Leavell, The Shareholders as Judges of Alleged Wrongs by Directors, 35
TuiL. L. Rsv. 331, 353 (1961); Stickells, Derivative Suits-The Requirement of
Demand Upon the Stockholders, 33 B.U.L. REv. 435, 440 (1953).
18 Instant case at 539.
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fact that the M & T shareholders at the same meeting had reelected the
eight directors who had cooperated with Canco by permitting the violation,
the court concluded that the shareholders had, in effect, attempted to ratify
an illegal act.19
If binding, the stockholders' vote would have left M & T open to
further victimization, for the vote could not have rendered legal the previ-
ously illegal collusion between Canco and the M & T directors, and it would
have amounted to the kind of uncoerced acquiescence in infractions of the
antitrust laws that is regarded as such participation in the violation that
the cooperative victim is deemed as much in breach of the law as the active
violator.2 0  In this sense the stockholders' vote was correctly characterized
by the court as "a ratification of violations of Federal law . ... 21
Even if the Solomont approach had been followed in the instant case,
the result might well have been the same, for Solomont requires that the
shareholder vote not to sue be a reasonable business judgment, and the
M & T vote was seemingly unreasonable on its face. The usual good
reasons not to sue-fear of undue expense 2 and bad publicity-are clearly
very different from a desire to have some advantage from violating the law.
It is arguable that plaintiff-stockholder could have brought a direct
action against the directors of M & T to restrain them from further illegal
conduct.2 3 Thus, even if precluded from bringing a derivative suit by the
vote which preceded the instant case, he might have instituted a suit for
injunction which would have brought into issue the very questions as to the
illegality of the directors' transactions which were raised in this case. To
establish that the directors were harming plaintiff's interest in the corpora-
tion by their activities would require proof similar to that which will
be called for when the present case is tried on the merits, and much of the
same adverse publicity and corporate expense in defending the suit would
be incurred in either action. The result of the instant case permits the
plaintiff to get directly to the substance of his allegations without further
technical obstructions. The policy of the antitrust laws to prevent the
kind of conduct which was alleged in the instant case suggests that a share-
19 Instant case at 539-40. The application of the term "ratify" to stockholders'
votes before derivative suits is a mere label for a legal conclusion. In one sense there
is a ratification every time a shareholders' vote bars a suit from being brought; in
that sense the vote in Solomont "ratified" illegal conduct, for the court permitted the
vote to prevent the violations from being subject to legal action.
20 United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 161 (1948). Cf. Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Blackmore, 277 Fed. 694 (2d Cir. 1921) (alternative holding).
21 Instant case at 540.
2 2 Antitrust suits are typically "big" suits. See FmLD & KAPLAN, MATERIA.S oN
CIVIL PROCEDURE 485 (1953).
23 See De Koven v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry., 216 Fed. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1914); ef.
Schechtman v. Wolfson, 244 F.2d 537, 539 (2d Cir. 1957) (dictum), 66 YALE LJ.
413; Hill v. Erwin Mills Inc., 239 N.C. 437, 80 S.E.2d 358 (1954). But see Con-
tinental Sec. Co. v. Michigan Cent. P.R., 16 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 274
U.S. 741 (1928).
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holder should have a right to invoke the treble damage sanction,24 even
though the other stockholders may have determined that the corporation
would benefit by the violation. The antitrust laws are intended to protect
the public from just this sort of "reasonable" action.
EVIDENCE-TESTIMONY AS TO PRIOR IDENTIFICATION OF DE-
FENDANT HELDADmISSIBLE AS SUBSTANTIVE EVIDENCE BUT INSFFI-
CIENT ALoNE To SUSTAIN CoNvCTIoN
The victim of a burglary walked into her apartment as the crime was
being committed and briefly saw the burglars before they fled. At trial,
six months later,' she was unable positively to identify the defendants as
the men she had seen. 2 But the judge admitted a policeman's testimony
that an hour after the crime he had shown her seven to ten small photo-
graphs from which she had chosen two as being of the men she had seen,
and that the photographs thus selected depicted the defendants. Defendants
were convicted. On appeal, the Supreme Court of California held that
the admission of the policeman's testimony was not error and that an in-
criminating admission made by one of the defendants at the time of his
arrest was sufficient evidence of identity to sustain that defendant's con-
viction. Regarding the other defendant, however, the court held that the
testimony as to the prior identification, standing alone, was insufficient to
establish his identity as one of the burglars, and his conviction was reversed
and remanded for a new trial. People v. Gould, 54 Cal. 2d 621, 354 P.2d
865, 7 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1960).
Even when they have been preceded by extrajudicial identifications
in which the danger of suggestion was strong,3 courtroom identifications are
admissible and have generally been held sufficient to identify the defend-
ant as the perpetrator of the crime at issue.4 But, because of its hearsay
character, testimony as to a prior identification is generally not admitted
24 Compare 2 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 412, 414 (1961).
1See Opening Brief of Appellant Marudas, p. 1, People v. Gould, 1 Cal. Rptr.
726 (Dist Ct. App. 1959).
2She testified that one of the defendants had "some features but not all of the
features" of one of the men she had seen but that she did not see anyone in the court-
room who looked like the other man. People v. Gould, 54 Cal. 2d 621, 625, 354 P.2d
865, 866, 7 Cal. Rptr. 273, 274 (1960).
3 For example, where the suspect was simply displayed to the witness without
the use of a lineup, or where the lineup itself was unfair. See cases cited note 4 infra.
4 See, e.g., People v. Branch, 127 Cal. App. 2d 438, 274 P.2d 31 (Dist. Ct. App.
1954); People v. Crenshaw, 15 Ill. 2d 458, 155 N.E.2d 599, cert. denied, 359 U.S. 997
(1959); People v. Mikka, 7 Ill. 2d 454, 131 N.E.2d 79 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
1009 (1956); People v. Lanphear, 6 Ill. 2d 346, 128 N.E.2d 892 (1955). But see
People v. Sanders, 357 Ill. 610, 192 N.E. 697 (1934) ; cf. People v. Peck, 358 Ill. 642,
193 N.E. 609 (1934) ; People v. Crane, 302 Ill. 217, 134 N.E. 99 (1922) (sufficiency of
identification was so doubtful that, combined with other prejudicial error, it necessi-
tated a new trial for defendant).
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as substantive evidence,5 but only for purposes of demonstrating a witness'
credibility.6 A few cases, however, have dismissed the hearsay objection,
sometimes under the rationale expressed in the instant case that the iden-
tifying witness' presence in court largely avoids the danger of hearsay by
permitting cross-examination about the original identification.
7
The instant case, involving two separate appeals from convictions based
on the same crime but different quanta of evidence as to identity, focuses
attention on two complementary controls by which extrajudicial identifica-
tions may be handled-standards of admissibility and standards of suffi-
ciency. The intermediate court of appeals simply labeled the policeman's
testimony as hearsay and held it inadmissible against one defendant, whose
conviction was therefore reversed, but admissible for purposes of corrobora-
tion against the other, whose conviction was affirmed.8 The supreme court
arrived at the same disposition of the case, but, significantly, rested its hold-
ing on other grounds. Instead of seeking in the equivocal courtroom iden-
tification of one of the defendants 9 a crutch to support evidence as to the
more persuasive prior identification, the court sensibly ruled that in view
of its acknowledged probative value,'0 the policeman's testimony was prop-
5 See, e.g., People v. Scott, 296 Il1. 268, 129 N.E. 798 (1921); McCandless v.
State, 49 Okla. Crim. 116, 295 Pac. 412 (1930) ; McCoRmscic, EVIDExCE § 39 (1954) ;
Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 1941-45, 59 HAcv. L. REv. 481, 545 (1946). A dis-
tinction is sometimes drawn between the identifying witness' testimony concerning
the prior identification and that of some other observer, the latter being inadmissible.
See Cominent, 19 MD. L. REv. 201, 212-20 (1959); Comment, 30 RocKy Mr. L. REv.
332 (1958).
6 It has been admitted to corroborate a courtroom identification, see, e.g., United
States v. Forzano, 190 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1951) ; Commonwealth v. Locke, 335 Mass.
106, 138 N.E.2d 359 (1956), to rehabilitate an impeached witness, see, e.g., People v.
Ferrara, 18 Cal. App. 271, 122 Pac. 1089 (Dist. Ct. App. 1912); Skipper v. Com-
monwealth, 195 Va. 870, 80 S.E.2d 401 (1954) ; Thompson v. State, 223 Ind. 39, 58
N.E.2d 112 (1944) (dictum), to rehabilitate a witness who has been shown to have a
motive for fabrication which was not present when the prior identification took place,
see, e.g., DiCarlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 268 U.S. 706
(1925); People v. Slobodion, 31 Cal. 2d 555, 191 P.2d 1, cert. denied, 335 U.S. 835
(1948); State v. Moon, 20 Idaho 202, 117 Pac. 757 (1911), to impeach a party's
own witness whose turnabout testimony has come as a surprise, see, e.g., State v.
Connelly, 5 NJ. Misc. 393, 136 Atl. 603 (Sup. Ct. 1927) (dictum); cf. People v.
Gillespie, 111 Mich. 241, 69 N.W. 490 (1896), or to refresh the recollection of such
a witness, State v. Duffy, 134 Ohio St. 16, 15 N.E.2d 535 (1938).
7 Commonwealth v. Saunders, 386 Pa. 149, 155, 125 A.2d 442, 445 (1956) ; State
v. Wilson, 38 Wash. 2d 593, 617-18, 231 P.2d 288, 300-01, cert. denied, 342 U.S. 855
(1951); Blake v. State, 157 Md. 75, 85-86, 145 Atl. 185, 189 (1929) (dissenting
opinion); cf. Powell v. State, 332 S.W.2d 483 (Ark. 1960) (officer could be asked
whether witness made an extrajudicial identification, on the theory the officer was
only explaining certain of his actions); People v. Spinello, 303 N.Y. 193, 201-02,
101 N.E.2d 457, 460-61 (1951); N.Y. CODE CRrn. PRO. §393-b; OHIO REv. CODE
§ 2945.55 (1954). Compare Basoff v. State, 208 Md. 643, 650, 119 A.2d 917, 921
(1956) (danger of hearsay avoided because prior identification made under circum-
stances precluding "unfairness or unreliability"). See generally McCoRmIcK, Evi-
DEN E § 39 (1954) ; Comment, 19 MD. L. REv. 201 (1959) ; Conmnent, 30 RocKY Mr.
L. REv. 332 (1958) ; 8 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 467 (1961).
8 People v. Gould, 1 Cal. Rptr. 726, 730 (Dist. Ct App. 1959).
9 See note 2 supra.
10 See Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept,
62 HARv. L. Rsv. 177, 192-96 (1948) ; Comment, 19 MD. L. REv. 201 (1959) ; Com-
ment, 30 RocKY Mr. L. REv. 332 (1958). But see State v. Saporen, 205 Minn. 358,
362, 285 N.W. 898, 901 (1939).
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erly admitted as substantive evidence. The court justified this relaxation
of the hearsay rule by characterizing the evidence as to the extrajudicial
identification as more reliable than a courtroom identification, since it was
made so soon after the original observation.1 But the court went on to
scrutinize the weight of this evidence and concluded that it was not enough
to sustain a verdict. Such attention to the overall sufficiency of the evi-
dence is necessary to counterbalance the risk created by a relaxed standard
of admissibility which permits evidence produced by suggestion to come
before the jury.12 Thus, while the California court appears ready to admit
some questionable evidence for what it is worth, the court also indicated
that such evidence must be worth something, or it will not sustain a
conviction.
The language in which the court gives the criteria of "worth" or suffi-
ciency of evidence is ambiguous. First the court seems to lay down a
black letter rule of insufficiency as rigid as the rule of inadmissibility from
which it earlier freed itself: "An extrajudicial identification that cannot
be confirmed by an identification at the trial is insufficient to sustain a
conviction in the absence of other evidence tending to connect the defend-
ant with the crime." 13 But the court then points out that the circumstances
of the prior identification in the instant case raise suspicions about the
quality of the evidence. 14  Thus it is not clear whether the principal ele-
ment of insufficiency was the witness' failure to repeat the prior identifica-
tion in court or the dubiousness of the original identification. In view of
the court's language extolling the freshness and reliability of early iden-
tifications, the mere failure to repeat an identification in court would not
seem to be so crucial as necessarily to render the evidence insufficient. 15
11 Instant case at 626, 354 P.2d at 867, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 275. The court limited
the possible impact of its holding by stressing the importance of the identifying
witness' presence in court. Ibid.
12 See 1960 ANN. SURVEY Am. L. 556-57. See generally Ladd, The Relationship
of the Principles of Exclusionary Rules of Evidence to the Problem of Proof, 18
MINN. L. REv. 506 (1934); McCormick, Tomorrow's Law of Evidence, 24 A.B.A.J.
507, 581 (1938).
'3 Instant case at 631, 354 P.2d at 870, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 278.
14 "The small size of the group increased the danger of suggestion.
Identification from a still photograph is substantially less reliable than identification
of an individual seen in person." Id. at 631, 354 P.2d at 870, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 278.
There is a further risk that inquiry into the circumstances of a prior identification
from photographs will reveal to the jury that defendant has a criminal record. Such
photographs are usually "mug" shots with numbers on them, taken from the police
files, and may be characterized as such by the prosecutor despite the rule against
admission of evidence of arrests or convictions tending to show bad character. See
Colbert v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W.2d 825 (Ky. 1957) ; Commonwealth v. Robinson,
163 Pa. Super. 16, 23, 60 A.2d 824, 827 (1948). But see Riley v. State, 74 Okla.
Crim. 363, 126 P.2d 284 (1942).
'5 Failure to repeat a prior identification might sometimes indicate that the
identification was uncertain and thus unreliable initially despite its proximity to the
original observation. See Commonwealth v. Saunders, 386 Pa. 149, 160-66, 125 A.2d
442, 446-50 (1956) (dissenting opinion). However, it could as easily indicate the
effect of normal forgetfulness. See instant case at 626, 354 P.2d at 867, 7 Cal. Rptr.
at 275. In the absence of concrete evidence of suggestion in the prior identification,
these conflicting inferences might best be resolved by the jury. Like a hard-and-fast
rule of substantive inadmissibility of prior identification evidence, an inflexible rule
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There is no indication in the language of the opinion that a courtroom
identification might be so infected by the likelihood of suggestion in an
earlier identification as to make the entire evidence as to identity insuffi-
cient. Courtroom identifications have been held sufficient even when
preceded by extrajudicial identifications far more likely to have been the
product of suggestion than the one in the instant case.' 6 Perhaps this
results from the purely corroborative function for which evidence of extra-
judicial identification is usually admitted.1 In that situation, the court's
attention is focused on the courtroom identification-the substantive evi-
dence-while the initial identification, which is likely to be the foundation
of the courtroom identification, arouses less concern. But when the same
evidence may be admitted for its substantive content, courts may pay closer
attention to the circumstances surrounding its elicitation and may tighten
control of the quality of that evidence, whether it accompanies a courtroom
identification or appears alone.' 8 Even though the witness may be available
for cross-examination, the scope of the jury's judgment of credibility may
frequently be limited by the witness's poor memory: if he cannot remember
well enough to make an identification in court, he will probably be an
unfruitful subject for cross-examination. Realizing the possible effects of
an early identification by a suggestible witness, a court could consistently
require a more convincing totality of proof when there has been an extra-
judicial identification (either with or without repetition in court) than when
there is only a courtroom identification.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - DISABLING PSYCOSIS
CAUSED BY EMOTIONAL PRESSURES OF ASSEMBLY LINE HELD A
COMPENSABLE IDJURY UNDER STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
ACT.
Claimant, a machine operator, found himself unable to keep up with
the assembly line on which he was employed without using a procedure
forbidden by the foreman. When he fell behind, the other workers on the
line berated him, and when he used the forbidden procedure, he was
reprimanded by the foreman. After a while he suffered a mental col-
of insufficiency might have the practical defects of encouraging defendants to seek
delays before trial in hope that the witness will forget and of tempting the prosecutor
to reinforce the witness' memory, thus introducing an element of false assuredness
into his testimony.
16 See cases cited note 4 .rupra. But see Reamer v. United States, 229 F.2d 884
(6th Cir. 1956). The instant case could be read as casting doubt on this state of
the law. See 8 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 467, 469-70 (1961).
17 See cases cited note 6 supra. In spite of the theoretical distinction, "cor-
roborative!' evidence, it has been suggested, is probably given considerable weight by
the jury, who either fail to understand or disregard the judge's instruction dis-
tinguishing between substantive and corroborative evidence. See McCoRMIcK, EVI-
DENCE § 39 (1954); 3 WIGMORE, EviDENcE § 1018(b) (3d ed. 1940).
18 See Comment, 30 RocKY MT. L. REV. 332, 338 (1958).
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lapse-medically described as paranoid schizophrenia-and was hospitalized
for a month. The psychiatric testimony at the hearing on his claim for
workmen's compensation showed that while there was nothing unusual
about the assembly line job, its pressures triggered a predisposition of
claimant's personality toward schizophrenia. The referee awarded com-
pensation and the appeal board, by a divided vote, affirmed, finding that the
claimant's injury was caused by his employment, and was therefore com-
pensable under the state workmen's compensation act.1 The Supreme
Court of Michigan affirmed the award, holding that a disabling psychosis
caused by the emotional pressures of a job to which the claimant cannot
adjust is a compensable injury under the state act. Carter v. General
Motors Corp., 361 Mich. 577, 106 N.W.2d 105 (1960).
Workmen's compensation statutes are designed to provide expeditious
cash benefits and paid medical care to victims of work-connected injuries
without regard to fault on the part of employer or employee.2 In return
for this protection, the employee agrees to forgo any common-law right
of action against his employer which may arise from an injury.3 It is not
necessary that the employment be the sole cause of an injury in order for
the employee to receive compensation; so long as it in some way con-
tributed to the disability, an award of compensation may be sustained.
4
Thus evidence of a preexisting condition will not automatically disqualify
an employee from receiving compensation,5 if the trier of fact can find some
I The two members who favored compensation arrived at their decision under dif-
ferent sections of the statute. One voted to grant compensation under part 7 of the
Michigan act, MIcH. Comp. LAWS § 417.1 (1948), which pertains to occupational dis-
eases, defining personal injury to include "a disease or disability which is due to causes
and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to the business of the employer
and which arises out of and in the course of the employment." Under this part the
test of compensation is whether the conditions of employment result in a hazard which
distinguishes it in character from other occupations. The other board member voted
to award compensation under part 2 of the act, MiIc. ComP. LAws § 412.1 (1948)
which provides compensation for a "personal injury arising out of and in the course
of . . . employment . . . ." Carter v. General Motors Corp., 361 Mich. 577, 582,
106 N.W.2d 105, 107-08 (1960).
2 See Crilly v. Ballou, 353 Mich. 303, 308, 91 N.W.2d 493, 496 (1958) ; Danek v.
Hommer, 14 N.J. Super. 607, 611, 82 A.2d 659, 660-61 (Essex County Ct. 1951), aff'd,
9 N.J. 56, 87 A.2d 5 (1952). See generally HoaoviTz, WoRimm's COMPEN SATI ON 8
(1944).
3 Danek v. Hommer, supra note 2, at 618-19, 82 A.2d at 664-65; Vescio v. Penn-
sylvania Elec. Co., 336 Pa. 502, 505, 9 A.2d 546, 549 (1939).
4 The employment is said to be a contributing factor when it combines with,
aggravates, or accelerates an existing disease or weakness to produce the disability.
Generally, the law will not weigh the relative importance of the two causes. See,
e.g., Shivers v. Biloxi-Gulfport Daily Herald, 236 Miss. 303, 308, 110 So. 2d 359,
361 (1959) (preexisting heart disease aggravated by loading fifty pound bundles);
Russo v. Wright Aeronautical Corp., 137 N.J.L. 346, 347, 60 A.2d 263, 264 (Sup. Ct.
1948) (aggravation of previous cancerous condition resulting in death) ; Webb v. New
Mexico Publishing Co., 47 N.M. 279, 297-98, 141 P.2d 333, 344-45 (1943) (printer's
hands allergic to soap furnished by employer) ; Harbor Plywood Corp. v. Department
of Labor and Indus., 48 Wash. 2d 553, 556-57, 295 P.2d 310, 312 (1956) (injury
which accelerated cancerous condition held compensable even though death would
have resulted anyway).
5 In this connection it is often said that the employer takes the employee as he
finds him. See, e.g., Cody v. Lewis & West Transit Mix, 186 Kan. 437, 440-41, 351
P.2d 4, 8 (1960); Larson v. Davidson-Boutell Co., 102 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn.
1960) ; Brown v. Industrial Comm'n, 9 Wis. 2d 555, 570, 101 N.W.2d 788, 797 (1960).
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causal connection between the disability and the employment., However,
inasmuch as the right to compensation is conferred by statute, it is incum-
bent upon the claimant to establish not only that the employment in fact
contributed to the injury sustained, but also that his injury was one of those
made compensable by the act. In at least four states, evidence establishing
merely that the employment was in fact a cause of the injury satisfies the
statutory requirement for compensation. 7 In most of the other states,
however, compensation is generally limited either by the terms of the
statute or by judicial decision to accidental injuries "arising out of and in
the course of the employment." s Thus the claimant must show not only
that the injury arose out of the employment, but also that it was caused
by an "accident." 9 Even in these states, however, the criteria of com-
pensability have varied, mainly because of different judicial interpretations
of the phrase "accidental injuries." For example, some states construe the
6 See Insurance Dep't v. Dinsmore, 233 Miss. 569, 102 So. 2d 691, suggestion of
error dinmissed, 233 Miss. 581, 104 So. 2d 296 (1958), in which the court affirmed
an award of compensation where the mental and emotional strain of a job involving
clerical and executive duties aggravated the employee's preexisting hypertension and
thereby contributed to her stroke. On the issue of causation the court stated that
the "medical evidence as a fact must show a causal connection between the obligations
of the employment and the final injury. . . . In each case the issue is one of medical
causation." Id. at 583, 104 So. 2d at 298 (1958). For a discussion of the various
criteria of cause-in-fact, see Comment, 70 YALE L.J. 1129, 1140-44 (1961). See
generally 37 TEXAs L. REv. 258 (1958). The court in the instant case found that
the psychiatric testimony presented by claimant satisfactorily established a nexus
between the mental breakdown and the employment. Instant case at 584-85, 106
N.W.2d at 108.
7 California, Iowa, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island have never had a "by accident"
requirement in their compensation statutes. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3208; IoWA CODE
ANN. § 85.61-.69 (1949); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 152, §1 (1957); RI. GEN.
LAWS ANN. §§ 28-33-1 (1956). See generally 1 LARSON, WORKIMIEN'S COMPENSATION
LAW § 38.83 (1952). Compare notes 8-9 infra. Minnesota amended its statute in
1953, substituting "personal injury" for "accidental injury." MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 176.011 (Supp. 1960). This change was first interpreted in Gillette v. Harold, Inc.,
101 N.W.2d 200 (Minn. 1960), in which a saleswoman, required by her job to be
on her feet most of the time, suffered a 35% disability when her continual standing
aggravated a preexisting deteriorative disorder of the joint of her left great toe;
the court held that the change in the statute abolished the need for showing that the
injury resulted from an "accident." Michigan has made a similar change in its
statute, but its significance is far from clear, though the opinion in the instant case
seems to suggest that a discernible series of specific events must still be identified as
having caused the injury in order for an award of compensation to be sustained. See
instant case at 593, 106 N.W.2d at 113.
8 See e.g., MicH. CompI. LAWS § 412.1 (1948), Hagopian v. Highland Park,
313 Mich. 608, 22 N.W.2d 116 (1946); Miss. CODE ANN. § 6998-02 (Supp. 1960);
N.J. REv. STAT. § 34:15-1 (Supp. 1959) ; N.Y. WOaMEN'S Comp. LAW § 2. "Arising
out of" has been interpreted as meaning that the injury must be caused by the job.
"Course of employment," on the other hand, has been construed as requiring that
the injury must occur at a time and place and in the performance of work reasonably
related to the employment. See LARSON, op. cit. supra note 7, §§ 6.10, 14.00. But see
N.D. Rnv. CODE § 65-01-02 (1960) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 411 (1952) ; TEx. REv.
STAT. ANN. art. 8306 (1956); Wis. STAT. § 102.03 (1957); Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§27-50 (1957).
9 This requirement was drawn from the English act, Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act, 1897, 60 & 61 Vict., c. 37, § 1, which served as a pattern for many of the
American statutes. By the time it had been adopted in this country, however, the
English courts had given it a broader construction than has generally been accepted in
this country. See Fenton v. J. Thorley & Co., [1903] A.C. 443. See generally
1 Larson, op. ct. supra note 7, § 38.10, at 517.
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phrase as requiring that the injury be caused by a single fortuitous mis-
hap,10 while others will permit compensation where a series of such events
culminated in disability; 11 some find the statutory requirement satisfied
when the injury occurs in the course of the claimant's usual activity,12 while
others require that it result from some unusual undertaking on his part.13
Similarly, a number of states interpret the phrase as contemplating only
those injuries caused by an unexpected event,14 while others also include
those which are an unexpected result of a routine activity.15 Statutory
10 See, e.g., Thuillez v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines, Inch, 187 Kan. 516, 358
P.2d 676 (1961); Eastern Shore Pub. Serv. Co. v. Young, 218 Md. 338, 146 A.2d
884 (1958); Davis v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 168 Ohio St. 482, 155 N.E.2d
889 (1959).
11 There appears to be a growing tendency on the part of courts to interpret the
phrase in this fashion. In many cases the courts have even strained the imagination
in identifying certain events as causative. See, e.g., Beveridge v. Industrial Acc.
Conim'n, 175 Cal. App. 2d 592, 346 P.2d 545 (Dist. Ct App. 1959) (back injury
resulting from series of slight injuries); Mottonen v. Calumet & Hecla, Inc., 360
Mich. 659, 105 N.W.2d 33 (1960) (strenuous physical labor in weeks preceding a
heart attack); Insurance Dep't v. Dinsmore, 233 Miss. 569, 102 So. 2d 691, sug-
gestion of error dismissed, 233 Miss. 581, 104 So. 2d 296 (1958) (stress of clerical
and executive job on hypertensive employee over a period of years contributed to her
stroke) ; Joy v. Florence Pipe Foundry Co., 64 N.J. Super. 13, 165 A.2d 191 (Super.
Ct 1960), petition for certification denied, 34 N.J. 67, 167 A.2d 55 (1961) (strain and
tension over a period of several months while supervising installation of machinery
caused heart attack).
12 See Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cardillo, 127 F.2d 334 (D.C. Cir. 1942)
(aggravation of arthritic condition caused by lifting five-gallon can); Garafola v.
Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 131 Conn. 572, 41 A.2d 451 (1945) (back sprain from usual
exertion) ; Wisconsin Appelton Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 269 Wisc. 312, 322, 69 N.W.2d
433, 439 (1955) (herniated disc after usual lifting).
Is Huff v. Aetna Ins. Co., 360 P.2d 667 (Colo. 1961) (denying compensation for
death resulting from a heart attack suffered after changing a tire on ground that
it was part of deceased's usual job); Plastic Assembled Products, Inc. v. Benkoe,
224 Md. 256, 167 A.2d 589 (1961) (awarding compensation to claimant who col-
lapsed in 110 degree heat caused in part by 400 Bunsen burners in the room) ; Sims
v. South Carolina State Comm'n of Forestry, 235 S.C. 1, 109 S.E.2d 701 (1959)
(denying compensation for heart attack suffered while climbing fire tower on the
ground that it was part of the claimant's usual job).
14 "Accidental cause" is the generally accepted shorthand term for this type of
accident. It encompasses the usual industrial accidents--explosions, collisions, slips,
and the like. See Sutton v. Brown's Tie & Lumber Co., 350 P.2d 345, 346 (Idaho
1960) (employee lifting fifteen pound boards suffered heart attack; award of com-
pensation reversed and remanded for the finding of whether this was an accident);
Eastern Shore Pub. Serv. Co. v. Young, 218 Md. 338, 342-43, 146 A.2d 884, 886
(1958) (employee lifted heavy buckarm in about same manner as he normally did;
held, resultant back injury was not an accidental injury) ; Davis v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co., 168 Ohio St. 482, 483-84, 155 N.E.2d 889, 890 (1959) (employee
building tires suffered a back injury when he pushed on a tire that had stuck; held,
injury not accidental).
15 "Accidental result" is the term courts and commentators use to characterize
an injury which occurs while the claimant is performing his usual job in the normal
manner. Such an injury is compensable upon a satisfactory showing of causation,
despite the absence of any unusual external force. See, e.g., Wesco Elec. Co. v.
Shook, 353 P.2d 743 (Colo. 1960) (electrician who suffered a herniation of an inter-
vertebral disc from working in an unnatural and cramped position awarded com-
pensation) ; Olson v. State Indus. Acc. Comm'n, 352 P.2d 1096 (Ore. 1960) (com-
pensation awarded claimant who suffered a heart attack while climbing on a truck
bed) ; Sosna v. Ford Motor Co., 192 Pa. Super. 456, 161 A.2d 657 (1960) (claimant
who sprained back pushing automobile back onto turntable awarded compensation).
Two recent decisions cited by the court in the instant case apparently establish
Michigan as accepting the accidental result theory: Coombe v. Penegor, 348 Mich.
635, 83 N.W.2d 603 (1957); Sheppard v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 348 Mich. 577, 83
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schemes which require such nicety in identifying the cause of an injury
make compensation for mental injuries especially difficult; for psychiatric
testimony, upon which recovery in these cases usually depends, can seldom
achieve the precision necessary to isolate the specific events-if indeed
there were any-which caused the mental collapse. Thus only when mental
injuries have accompanied physical injuries 16 or have resulted from a
sudden traumatic experience 1 7 have courts had any tendency to com-
pensate. The instant case is unusual, therefore, in that it allows compensa-
tion for a mental injury caused in neither of these two ways.
As the court recognized,' 8 the present case raised problems which the
long line of Michigan cases 19 involving mental injuries resulting from
sudden traumatic shocks or accompanying physical injuries did not pose.
In the case of a mental injury caused by a sudden trauma, medical testi-
mony merely establishes the extent and possible causes of the disability.
Lay testimony is then required to identify which of the possible causes in
fact occurred in the course of claimant's employment. In the instant case,
however, the psychiatric witness specifically identified what, in his opinion,
actually caused the disability. The importance of lay evidence was thereby
undermined, for claimant's coworkers were probably oblivious to the effect
N.W.2d 614 (1957). Some jurisdictions have extended the accidental result theory
to its apparent ultimate by holding that an accident arises out of the employment
when the degree of exertion required to perform the job is too much for the particular
worker involved. See Safeway Stores Inc. v. Harrison, 320 S.W.2d 131 (Ark. 1959);
Fulton County v. Windsor, 100 Ga. App. 237, 110 S.E.2d 594 (1959); Wilson v.
Saute Fe Trail Transp. Co., 185 Kan. 725, 347 P.2d 235 (1959) ; Richter v. Shoppe
Plumbing & Heating Co., 100 N.W.2d 96 (Minn. 1959).
16 See, e.g., American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 59 Ariz. 87,
123 P.2d 163 (1942); Watson v. Melman, Inc., 106 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1958); Pohl v.
American Bridge Div. U.S. Steel Corp., 109 So. 2d 823 (La. 1959). See generally
1 LARsoN, op. cit. supra note 7, §42.22 (1952). Courts generally will also com-
pensate where an emotional stimulus results in a purely physical injury. See McClain
v. Board of Educ., 30 N.J. 567, 154 A.2d 569 (1959) ; Church v. Westchester County,
253 App. Div. 859, 1 N.Y.S.2d 581 (1938); Hunter v. St. Mary's Natural Gas Co.,
122 Pa. Super. 300, 186 Atl. 325 (1936).
17 See Charon's Case, 321 Mass. 694, 75 N.E.2d 511 (1947) ; Bailey v. American
Gen. Ins. Co., 154 Tex. 430, 279 S.W.2d 315 (1955); Burlington Mills Corp. v.
Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291 (1941). Contra, Bekelski v. 0. F. Neal Co.,
141 Neb. 657, 4 N.W.2d 741 (1942) ; Voss v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 14 N.J.
Misc. 791, 187 Atl. 334 (Workmen's Comp. Bureau 1936) ; Liscio v. S. Makransky &
Sons, 147 Pa. Super. 483, 24 A.2d 136 (1942). In Webber v. Wofford-Brindley
Lumber Co., 113 So. 2d 23 (La. 1959), the court extended compensation to a dis-
ability even though its causation was imaginary and the result of a traumatic neurosis.
The court said that the test for recovery in such cases was "whether the employee is
sincere in his belief that he suffers a disabling resultant of a real injury . .. .
Id. at 25. Some statutes, however, specifically require that the injury be physical. See,
e.g., NEB. Rsv. STAT. § 48-151 (1952). Compare Wis. STAT. § 102.01 (Supp. 1961)
(" 'injury' is mental or physical harm to an employee caused by accident").
Is See instant case at 585, 106 N.W.2d at 109.
19 See Redfern v. Sparks-Withington Co., 353 Mich. 286, 91 N..W.2d 516 (1958)
("conversion hysteria!' traceable to injury received when struck by steel weight);
Hayes v. Detroit Steel Casting Co., 328 Mich. 609, 44 N.W.2d 190 (1950) (neurosis
resulting from injury which necessitated removal of an eye); Karwacki v. General
Motors Corp., 293 Mich. 355, 292 N.W. 328 (1940) (latent mental disturbance
aggravated by work-incurred infection); Klein v. Len H. Darling Co., 217 Mich.
485, 187 N.W. 400 (1922) (death from shock which resulted from dropping a register
on a coworker's head).
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which assembly line pressures had on claimant's mental equilibrium.20  In
such a case, the psychiatrist's role obviously is enhanced, and the pos-
sibilities for abuse of his influence are increased. Therefore, it is significant
that the court carefully separated the questions of causation and compen-
sability,21 thus preserving to itself the peculiarly legal issue of whether
the claimant's injury was compensable under the act. In so doing, the
court avoided giving the psychiatrist's testimony such conclusive weight
as a criterion based solely on cause-in-fact would have produced in the
instant case.22  Instead, the court, by pinpointing certain events-"the
pressure of [the] job and the pressure of [the] foreman" 23 -as causative
factors, succeeded in imposing some semblance of a "by accident" require-
ment. As a result, the likelihood of compensation awards becoming com-
pletely dependent upon the word of medical "advocates" 2 4-physicians who
uncannily find a connection between a claimant's disability and his employ-
ment-is avoided, and the prospect of workmen's compensation becoming
(in effect) a program of blanket insurance for employees, which it was
not intended to be,2 5 is negated. The present case, while admittedly ex-
panding the judicially defined range of workmen's compensation,28 never-
theless retains as an essential feature of compensation proceedings some
determination by a judicial or quasi-judicial body that a claimant's injury
was one which the statute was intended to cover, thereby avoiding an
abdication of this function to medical experts.
2 0 Compare the account of the physician's testimony in Klein v. Len H. Darling
Co., 217 Mich. 485, 187 N.W. 400 (1922), with the psychiatrist's testimony in the
instant case at 583-84, 106 N.W.2d at 108-09.
21 Instant case at 583, 106 N.W.2d at 108.
22 See note 7 supra.
23 Instant case at 593, 106 N.W.2d at 113.
24 See Holschuh, Advocacy in the Preparation and Presentatiov of Medical Evi-
dence, 21 OHIo ST. L.J. 160-61 (1960) ; Peck, Impartial Medical Testimony, 22 F.R.D.
21, 22 (1958). Courts have also noted this problem. See Kemeny v. Skorch, 22 Ill.
App. 2d 160, 170, 159 N.E.2d 489, 493 (1959); Murphy v. Pennsylvania R.R., 292
Pa. 213, 216, 140 Atl. 867, 869 (1927).
25 See, e.g., Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Scott, 215 Ga. 491, 496, 111 S.E.2d 223, 226
(1959); Sutton v. Brown's Tie & Lumber Co., 350 P.2d 345, 348 (Idaho 1960);
Riley v. Kohlenberg, 316 Mich. 144, 148-49, 25 N.W.2d 144, 146 (1946).
28 A useful discussion of the effect of awarding compensation in cases of mental
injury is in Comment, 70 YALE L.J. 1129, 1145-50 (1961).
